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cleavage at the point where the 9 court chooses to draw the line between
public interest and private right.'
The analysis is further complicated where a word of common meaning
is itself used in a statute. In such cases judges are tempted to argue that
the application of the word involves a purely factual finding, and Is
therefore not subject to the judicial control which is appropriate to
conclusions of law.20

In the instant case a determination between the application of
tariff items 427 and 427a is not merely a question of fact; it also
entails a legal determination of the ambit of these two categories.
The area is far from clear. It would certainly aid matters if the courts

would recognize that the tribunals do decide questions of law.
THOMAS C. MARSHALL*

WILLS
MacGregor v. Ryan, [1965] S.C.R. 757.
WILLS - VALIDITY - ALLEGATION THAT TESTATRIX LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - ALTERNATIVE ALLEGATION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE - WHETHER
SUSPICION
RAISED
BY
CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING EXECUTION OF WILL DISPELLED - ONUS OF PROOF.

In the recent case of MacGregor v. Ryan' the Supreme Court of
Canada was afforded an opportunity of authoritatively settling several
contentious issues in the law of wills. An appeal had been taken by
the caveator from the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment dismissing
an appeal from the order of the Surrogate Judge admitting the will

to probate. The caveator attacked the validity of the will on the
traditional grounds that the will was not duly executed, the testatrix
did not possess the requisite testamentary capacity, and the will was

procured by undue influence.

In the Supreme Court of Canada the first of these grounds was

abandoned, leaving the issues of testamentary capacity and undue

influence, 2 but the case is significant from a jurisprudential point of
view for its discussion of burdens and standards of proof.
The facts, as found by the learned trial judge and confirmed by

the Court of Appeal, were that the testatrix, aged ninety-one, and
confined in the hospital, told her sole remaining executor, on the
19 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review-Questions of Law (1955-56), 69 Harv.
L. R. 239, at p. 240n, quoting from Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the
Supremacy of Law (1927), p. 55.
20 Ibid., p. 243.
* Thomas C. Marshall, B.A. (Toronto), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of
the 1966 graduating class.
1 [19651 S.C.R. 757, (1966), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 126.
2 Judson, J. (dissenting) views the argument of the appellant as confined
to the issue of testamentary capacity (p. 128); Ritchie, J. (for the majority)
interprets the appellant's argument as being primarily directed to the issue
of undue influence (p. 132).
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occasion of a hospital visit, that she wished to change her will so as
to leave her entire estate to her sister, the wife of the executor, and
that he was "to take care of things" for her. The executor went
immediately to a local lawyer, known to the testatrix, and related
to him the testatrix's instructions. The solicitor at once prepared a
will incorporating these instructions and, still accompanied by the
executor, travelled directly to the hospital, where, after some discussion between the solicitor and the testatrix as to the contents and
effect of the will, the testatrix executed the new will. The executor,
though in the room at the time, took no part in the discussion or
execution of the will.
Mr. Justice Ritchie,3 to dispose of the appellant's allegation of
undue influence, embarked on a learned analysis of the English and
Canadian law on this subject, and in particular on the nature of the
evidence required and the burden of proof to be discharged in establishing a case of undue influence. The caveator had argued that in
view of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution, there
was a heavy burden resting on the proponents 4of the will to prove
affirmatively the righteousness of the transaction.
In order to appreciate Mr. Justice Ritchie's disposition of this
argument, it is vital to grasp the different sense in which the term
"burden of proof" may be used. J. B. Thayer described these two
meanings as follows:
(i) The peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given proposition
on which the parties are at issue,-who will lose the case if he does not
make his proposition out, when all has been said and done;
(ii) The duty of going forward in argument or in producing evidence,
of a case, or at any later moment throughout
whether at the beginning
5

the trial or discussion.

Thayer did not employ any descriptive terminology to characterize the two burdens to which he referred, but this has been contributed in profusion by his successors. The first mentioned onus,
which is the burden fixed by the substantive or procedural law of
establishing a proposition of fact in order to succeed in the case,
has been termed the legal 6 or persuasive7 burden, the burden of
proof on the pleadings s the risk of nonpersuasion 9 and the primary
burden of proof, fixed at the beginning and never shifting.' If, when
3
4

With whom Cartwright, Martland, and Spence, JJ. concurred.
Supra,footnote 1, at p. 132 (D.L.R.).

5 Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, p. 355. Judicially
noted by Harrison J. in Re Barter Estate; Corbett v. Wall (1939), 13 M.P.R.
359 (N.B. C.A.); and by Duff J. in Koop v. Smith (1915), 51 S.C.R. 554, at p.
558 and in Smith v. Nevins, [1925] S.C.R. 619, at p. 638.
6 Lord Denning, Presumptions and Burdens (1945), 61 L.Q.R. 379.
7 Dr. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law (The General Part), 2nd ed. s. 23.
8 Phipson, Law of Evidence (9th ed.), p. 32.
9 IX Wigmore, paras. 2485-9.
10 Winnipeg Electric Company v. Geel, [1932] A.C. 690 (P.C.). See also
Bridge, Presumptions and Burdens (1949), 12 Mod. Law Rev. 274; Smith v.
Nevins, [1925J S.C.R. 619, at p. 638; Ont. Equitable Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Baker, [1926] S.C.R. 297, at p. 308; Dillon v. Toronto Millstock Co., [1943]
S.C.R. 268.
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all the evidence is in, there is still some doubt in the mind of the
tribunal, the party who bears this onus must fail."
The accepted principle in the law of wills is that the onus probandi
-the primary onus of proving the will-rests in every case on the
propounders of the will.n In order to obtain probate of the will, the
executors must demonstrate that the testator was of sound mind,
memory and understanding, 13 i.e., that he understood the nature of
his act and its effects, the extent of the property of which he disposed,
and the nature of the
claims of others whom, by his will, he excluded
4
from participation.'
This principle is clearly set out by Baron Parke in the leading
case of Barry v. Butlin'5 in the first of two rules quoted by Ritchie J.
in his judgment:
[1] ... the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding
the Will; and he must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the ihstru16
ment so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable Testator.
The second sense in which burden of proof is used by Thayer,
subsequently called the evidential burden,'7 the burden of adducing
evidence,' 8 or the secondary burden of proof, is the burden of introducing sufficient evidence to raise a particular issue.1 9 This burden

11 Robins v. National Trust Co., [1927] A.C. 515 (P.C.), at p. 520, per
Lord Dunedin, as well as cases cited under footnote 10, supra.
12 A difficult problem for the Ontario courts has been whether the burden
of proof rests on the propounders of the will after the will has been proved
in common form. In England, the case law is clear that before and after
proof in common form the onus is on the propounders to establish testamentary capacity. See the vacillation of the Ontario rule in Badeneck v. Inglis
(1913), 29 O.L.R. 165 (C.A.); Larocque v. Landry (1922), 52 O.L.R. 479 (C.A.);
Robins v. National Trust, [19273 A.C. 515 (P.C.); and Re Mackenzie, [1944]
2 D.L.R. 79 (Ont. H.C.), where it was finally established that the Ontario rule
was different from the English rule. The Ontario rule is not followed in other
provinces: Od2/nak v. Feschuk [1928 1 D.L.R. 423 (Alta. C.A.); Re Kowalski,
[1952] 4 D.L.R. 117 (Man. C.A..
13 Lord Alverstone M.R. in Re Cheadle, Bishop and Holt, [1900] 2 Ch.

620 (C.A.), at p. 623; Leger v. Poirier,[19443 3 D.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.), at pp. 11-12.
14 Banks v. Goodfeflow (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, at p. 565, followed by the
S.C.C. in O'Neil et al. v. Royal Trust and McClure, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 545, at p.
554; [1946] S.C.R. 622. See also the statement of Lord Cranworth L.C. in
Boyse v. Rossborougb (1857), 6 H.L.C. 2, at p. 45: "The difficulty to be grappled
with arises from the circumstance that the question is almost always one of
degree. There is no difficulty in the case of a raving madman or of a drivelling
idiot, in saying that he is a person capable of disposing of property. But
between such an extreme case and that of a man of perfectly sound and
vigorous understanding, there is every shade of intellect, every degree of
mental capacity. There is no possibility of mistaking midnight for noon;
but at what precise moment twilight becomes darkness is hard to determine."
See also Murphier v. Lamphier, 31 O.L.R. 287 (Ont. H.C.); Lamb v. Brow
(1923), 54 O.L.R. 443 (Ont. H.C.), at p. 448; Re Davis, [1963] 2 O.R. 666 (C.A.);
Re McPhee (1966), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 520 (B.C.S.C.).
15 (1838), 2 Moo. P.C. 480, 12 E.R. 1089. As well see Harwood v. Balcer
(1840), 3 Moo. P.C. 282, 13 E.R. 117; Smith v. Nevins, [1925] S.C.R. 619, at
p. 640.
16 At pp. 482483.
17 Nigel Bridge and Glanville Williams, supra, footnotes 10 and 7 respectively.
18 Phipson, supra, footnote 8.
19 "A distinction is to be observed between the burden of proof as a
matter of substantive law or pleading, and the burden of proof as a matter
of adducing evidence." Dillon v. Toronto Millstock Co., [1943] S.C.R. 268.
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may or may not be borne by the same party who must bear the
primary burden.
The evidenciary burden is best illustrated in the law of wills by
the case of Sutton v. Saddler,20 unfortunately not mentioned in the
Supreme Court of Canada decision. In this case the heir-at-law sought
to attack the will by impeaching the mental competency of the testator. The learned trial judge directed the jury that the heir-at-law
was entitled to recover if he established incompetency. The full
Court of Common Pleas held that this was a misdirection and that
the heir-at-law need only put the matter in issue. The primary burden
of proving the testator's sanity remained with the propounder of
the will-the devisee. The principle in Sutton v. Saddler is often
referred to as the presumption of sanity in a probate case, but
"presumption" like "burden of proof" is a word admitting of many
meanings. It is clear that the effect of the presumption is to push
onto the party opposing the will the evidenciary burden of adducing
evidence on the question of sanity to put the matter in issue. But
the presumption does not affect the primary burden of proof, and
if there is doubt as to the sanity of the testator at the end of the
21
case, the proponents of the will must lose.
The difficulty arises when there is an allegation of undue influence. On whom is the burden of proof in regard to this issue, and
what kind of burden is it? There is support 22 for the proposition that
the attackers of the will need only adduce some evidence of undue
influence and thus bear only a secondary burden of proof. If doubt
remains at the end of the trial, then the proponents of the will must
fail, as in Sutton v. Saddler. The second rule in Barry v. Butlin may
be construed as lending some weight to this contention.
However, the better view is that the attackers of a will bear the
primary burden of affirmatively establishing undue influence. 23 Mr.
Justice Ritchie has authoritatively held this to be the position in
Canada, where he states:
There is a distinction to be borne in mind between producing sufficient
evidence to satisfy the Court that a suspicion raised by the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will have (sic) been dispelled and producing the evidence necessary to establish an allegation of undue in20 (1857), 3 C.B. (N.S.) 87.
21 See J. Desmond Morton's discussion of primary and secondary burdens
of proof in (1955) Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 137.
22 Smith v. Nevins, [1925] S.C.R. 619, at 639, quoting Baker v. Batt (1838),
2 Moo. P.C. 317, at 319-20. Tyrrell v. Painton, [1844] P. 151, at p. 159-160;
"... the principle is that wherever a will is prepared under circumstances
which raise a well-grounded suspicion that it does not express the mind of
the testator, the Court ought not to pronounce in favour of it unless the suspicion is removed."
23 Parfittv. Lawless (1872), L.R. 2 P. & D. 462, at p. 471: "The defendant
is bound to prove the issue he raised and it was necessary for him to establish
affirmatively by such evidence as the jury could reasonably act upon, that
the residuary clause of this will was obtained by the coercion of the plaintiff."
See also Craig v. Lamoureux, [1920] A.C. 349 (P.C.), at p. 356; Robins v.
National Trust Co., [1927] A.C. 515 (P.C.), at p. 522; Kaulback v. Archbold

(1901), 31 S.C.R. 387.
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fluence. The former task lies on the proponents of the will, the latter is
a burden which is assumed by those who are attacking the will and can
only be discharged by proof of the existence of an influence acting
upon the mind of the testator
of the kind described by Viscount Haldane
in Craig v. Lamoureux.24

It is therefore necessary to reconsider the second rule in Barry

v. Butlin from the point of view of degree or standard of proof, as
opposed to burden of proof. For a party who has a primary burden
of proof to succeed, he must, as a general rule, adduce evidence of
a greater weight than that adduced by his adversary. The extent of
the excess is referred to as the standard of proof. The law recognizes
at least two standards of proof: proof on a preponderance of probabilities, the standard appropriate for civil cases,25 and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the appropriate standard in criminal cases. 26
While there has been considerable scepticism as to whether there
is any difference between these two standards of proof, there has
also been extensive discussion as to whether there are not more than
two standards of proof. Though in theory the standard of proof in a
civil case is always proof on a balance of probabilities, in practice,
. .. there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree
depends on the subject matter. A civil court, when considering a charge
of fraud, will naturally require for itself a higher degree of probability
than that which it would require when asking if negligence is estab.
lished.27
This problem of the different standards of proof has been a
28
most vexatious one in matrimonial causes.

The second rule in Barry v. Butlin, therefore, may be considered
as indicating that there may be a slightly more onerous burden of
proof in certain circumstances:
[2] ... if a party writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a
benefit, that is a circumstance that ought generally to excite the suspicion
of the Court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and jealous In examining
the evidence in support of the instrument, in favour of which It ought
not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially
satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true Will of the
deceased. 2 9
This is emphasized even more clearly by Davey L.J. in Tyrrell v.
Painton:
24 Supra,footnote 1, at p. 138.
25 For an early case, see Cooper v. Slade (1858), 6 H.L.C. 746, at p. 772.
26 For an early case, see R. v. Winsor (1865), 4 F. & F. 363. See Lord
Denning's now famous statement in Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2
All E.R. 372 (K.B.), at pp. 373-374.
27 Per Denning L.J. in Bater v. Bater, [1951] P. 35 (C.A.), at p. 37; [1950]
2 All E.R. 458, at p. 459. See also Morris L.J., in Hornalv. Neuberger Products,
Ltd., [1956] 3 All E.R. 970 (C.A.), at p. 978.
28 Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] 2 All E.R. 190: "The same strict
proof is required in the case of a matrimonial offence as is required in connection with criminal offences properly so-called." Ginesi v. Ginesi, [1948] 1 All
E.R. 373 (C.A.); Preston-Jonesv. Preston-Jones, [1951] 1 All E.R. 124 (H.L.);
George v. George and Logie, [19501 O.R. 787 (C.A.); Smith v. Smith, [1952]
S.C.R. 312; Boykowych v. Boykowych, [1955] S.C.R. 151; Fridman, Standards
of Proof (1955), 33 Can. Bar Rev. 665.
29 Cited by Ritchie J., supra, footnote 1, at p. 133.
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the principle is, that wherever a will is prepared under circumstances
which raise a well-grounded suspicion that it does not express the mind
of the testator, the Court
ought not to pronounce in favour of it unless
the suspicion is removed.3 0
The above citations support the view that there is a standard of
proof intermediary between proof on a preponderance of probability
and proof beyond reasonable doubt. But a common sense approach
leads rather to the conclusion that different degrees of persuasion
may be demanded by the circumstances of particular cases. For
example, as a practical matter, a magistrate trying a petty theft
charge will be more readily persuaded, and by evidence of a different

quality and quantity, than a judge trying a capital murder case.
Mr. Justice Ritchie accepts this approach, stating it in this way:
Counsel for the appellant contended that in all cases where the circumstances surrounding the preparation of execution of the will give rise
to a suspicion, the burden lying on the proponents of that will to show
that it was the testator's free act is an unusually heavy one, but it would
be a mistake, in my view, to treat all such cases as if they called for the
meeting of some standard of proof of a more than onerous character.
The extent of the proof required is proportionate to the gravity of the
suspicion and3 1the degree of the suspicion varies with the circumstances
of each case.
It is submitted that Mr. Justice Ritchie has authoritatively stated
that the proper approach to be followed in wills cases where undue
influence is alleged, namely, that the court should distinguish the
primary onus of proving testamentary capacity,3 2 which is fixed on

the proponents throughout the trial but which may require a higher
degree of persuasion where there are suspicious circumstances, 33 and
the primary onus of alleging and proving undue influence, which, is
34
fixed on the attackers of the will.
Unfortunately, Ritchie J. found it unnecessary to discuss the
nature of undue influence, holding that the presence of undue influence was a question of fact decided by the learned trial judge and
affirmed by the Court of Appeal. It is submitted with respect that the
question of undue influence is always a mixed question of fact and law
30 [1894] p. 151, at pp. 159160, adopted by Sir Lyman Duff C.J.C. in Riach
et al. v. Ferris, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 118, at p. 122. See also Fulton v. Andrew
(1875), L.R. 7 E.L. 448; Brown v. Fisher (1890), 63 L.T. 465 (P.); Finney v.
Govett (1909), 25 T.L.R. 186 (C.A.); Re Begley, [1939] I.R. 479.
31 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 139. See also the recent case of Be Davis, [1963]
2 O.R. 666 (C.A.), at p. 683 where it was held that the burden of proof lying
on the proponents of a will to prove testamentary capacity is considerably
increased in certain circumstances, e.g., where the will is a marked departure
from all previous wills and where there is a history of progressive impairment
of the mental faculties.
32 The first rule in Barry v. ButZin.
33 The second rule in Barryv. But in.
34 The interaction of these three separate problems-the primary onus
of proof, the secondary onus of proof, and the standard of proof necessary
to discharge the primary onus of proof where there are suspicious circumstances-is evident in the Privy Council decision of Harmes v. Hinkson, [1946]
3 D.L.R. 497; (1946), 62 T.L.R. 445.
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and that some reference to the legal nature of undue influence was
35
desirable.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Judson rests not so much on a different
interpretation of the law as on a different view of the facts. He also
cites the statement of Duff C.J.C. taken from TyrrelI v. Painton
quoted above, but he is more ready to find suspicious circumstances
in the facts. As examples, he notes that the executor never took the
stand to give evidence, and that there was no evidence adduced to
explain the "sudden, precipitated revocation of a previous will which
had been twice confirmed by the testatrix when she was undoubtedly
of sound mind".3 6 In addition, the testatrix did not instruct the

solicitor personally, but only through an intermediary, the executor,

who did not testify.37 Judson J. also questions whether, on the facts,
the solicitor discharged his duty of making an independent inquiry
to ascertain the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, citing the
3 8
Considering all these
leading Ontario case of Murphy v. Lamphier.
factors, he concludes that the primary onus on the propounder of the
will to establish capacity has not been discharged, but this holding
does not subtract from the authoritative statement of the legal principles found in the majority decision.
ROBERT WITTERICK"
35 For a discussion of the legal nature of undue influence as requiring
fraud or coercion in relation to the will see: Boyse v. Rossborough (1857), 6
H.L. 2; Hall v. Hal (1868), 1 P. & D. 481; Wingrove v. Wingrove (1886), 11
P.D. 81; Hampson v. Guy (1891), 64 L.T. 778 (C.A.); Baudains v. Richardson,
[1906] A.C. 169 (P.C.). There is no presumption of undue influence in testamentary matters: Parfitt v. Lawless (1872), L.R. 2 P. & D. 462. For Canadian
case law see Crompton v. Williams, [1938) O.R. 543, and cases cited in footnote
23, supra.
Cf. the presumption regarding undue influence and inter vivos gifts.
36
Supra, footnote 1, at p. 129. This brings to mind the statement of
Knight Bruce, L.J., in Hart v. Tulk (1852), 2 De G.M. & G. 300, at 313: "Testators have a right to be eccentric, capricious, arbitrary, and, so far as the term
may be used, unjust; nor does it seldom, I believe, happen that they have
reasons known to themselves, though not to those who expound their wills,
for dispositions seemingly strange and unreasonable. Testators are not bound
to have good or any reasons for what they do, or when they have reasons
to state them."
37 See Batton Singhz v. Amirchand, [1948] A.C. 161 (P.C.).
38 (1914), 31 O.L.R. 287; aff'd (1914), 20 D.L.R. 906, 32 O.L.R. 19 (C.A.).
See also the recent Ontario case of Be Davis, [1963] 2 O.R. 666 (C.A.), at p. 673.
* Robert Witterick, B.A. (York), LL.B. (Osgoode) is a member of the 1966
graduating class.

